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INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper examines two reasons why the development of airframes as a 
national aircraft industry1 have been met with more success in Brazil than in 
Japan: First, Brazil's aircraft industry was nurtured by a unified government 
administrative structure while in Japan the same industry instead became a 
victim of inter-ministerial battles. Second, the Brazilian government 
nurtured a single specialized national-champion firm, Embraer (Empresa 
Brasileira de Aeronáutica S.A.)2, while the Japanese government relied on 
the traditional consortium approach that epitomizes most Japanese post-
World War II industrial ventures. While usually successful, the consortium 
approach did not do as well to build a domestic aircraft industry in Japan. 
Making airplanes turned out to be an exception in Japanese business partly 
also because of the involvement of several government agencies at varying 
levels. In other Japanese industries, such as steel, semiconductors, and 
computers, a single ministry, the Ministry of International Trade and 
Industries (MITI) had managed these consortiums relatively successfully.  
The remarkable economic growth observed in the development of 
high-technology industry in some Asian countries including Japan, South 
Korea, Taiwan and Singapore from the 1960s to the 1980s, had attracted 
many scholarly studies. Some studies focused on the characteristics of 
macro institutional supports such as national research institutes, financial 
incentives, and education systems—that is the "national innovation system" 
(Nelson, 1993).  Others focused on the role of the government (Johnson, 
1982) while yet others focused on industrial linkages or the relations 
between the private sector and the government (Hobday, 1995; Okimoto, 
1989; Evans, 1995; Woo-Cumings, 1999). There have also been studies that 
showed experiences in different countries and significantly different 
characteristics of innovation among various industrial sectors (Mowery & 
Nelson, 1999).  
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This study attempts to look further by focusing on a specific industry, 
airplane design and production, by arguing that issues such as technological 
regimes and their natural trajectories can only be understood within specific 
institutional contexts that are not only industry specific but may also be 
unique from country to country. From our study that compares between the 
national aircraft industries of Brazil and Japan, the institutional set up 
matters more significantly than it used to be recognized, to the extent that it 
can override technological competency as a success factor. Japan is clearly 
more technological advanced than Brazil. Yet, within the narrow confines of 
the Brazilian aircraft industry, which is clearly high-tech, this study 
provides us a glimpse as to how the institutional factor can potentially 
enable Brazil to make a, perhaps unique, leap ahead of Japan.  
 
 
NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE APPLICATION OF 
TECHNOLOGY  
 
There are two fundamental reasons why Japan, despite its technological 
supremacy might have lost out to Brazil in their respective attempts to 
develop a national aircraft industry. First, Brazil had a unitary government 
commitment and support system that Japan did not and second, Brazil 
established a specialized, national-champion firm but Japan did not. Even 
though Brazil made a much later start in the aircraft industry compared to 
Japan and even though Brazil was technologically inferior to Japan, the 
Brazilian government was able to "fast-track" the industry's growth by 
establishing its own "crown-jewel" company. Then, an enabling institutional 
setting supplemented by strong public commitments led by Brazil's Ministry 
of Aeronautics helped foster the initial phase of heavy technological and 
financial investments needed for an aircraft industry to take off.  
The creation in Brazil of a single, national champion, airframe-
specialized firm—Embraer might be considered counter-intuitive by way of 
government policy, as any national champion firm would be typically 
perceived as overly protected, tainted with corruption and established 
mainly for political reasons rather than on the merits of economic rationale 
(Waterbury) 3 . But despite such likely pitfalls, Embraer, as a national 
champion firm became instead the epitome of the Brazilian government's 
commitment to produce a high tech industry within its borders as a do or die 
effort. 
In contrast, government involvement in Japan's aircraft industry was 
marred by the rivalry of three related ministries in Japan: MITI 4 , the 
Ministry of Transportation, and the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) resulting 
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in much inter-ministerial bickering as to which agency would play which 
role in the aircraft industry's development effort. 
Japanese industries were typically developed through the consortium 
approach. Four major conglomerates (MHI, KHI, IHI, FHI 5 ) and many 
small manufacturers divided the task of developing a series of aircraft 
models that had begun as far back as just after the end of World War II. This 
consortium method, one of the aims being to divide the risks associated with 
heavy investment, had been the pinnacle of Japan's successful post-war 
industrial developments in various sectors such as automobiles and 
semiconductors. The only problem is, the consortium approach did not seem 
to work as well in the case of the aircraft industry.   
 
 
THE TECHNOLOGY REGIME OF THE AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY 
 
The relation between the type of technology needed for developing a 
particular product and the kind of institutional support that needs to be 
present is of the utmost importance if we are to understand why some 
attempts in industrial development succeed while others fail (Nelson & 
Winter, 1997; Klevorick et al., 1995) 6 . A recent work by Mowery and 
Nelson emphasized the importance of sectoral differences in their 
comparative study of seven industries (1999), and helped explain why 
exceptional performances are possible, even when the level of technology, 
in relative terms, had been trailing behind others as this paper had observed 
between Brazil and Japan. 
There are three technological requirements for a commercial airframe 
manufacturing to be successful7. First, there must be an economies of scale. 
Second, airframe manufacturing requires a system technology in which 
various parts must be integrated coherently and flawlessly, rather than by 
merely aggregating diverse component technologies that are available on 
hand. There is thus a stark difference between making airplanes and 
personal computers, the latter being modular and component based. Third, 
in the case of airplanes, development, modification and maintenance require 
extremely intimate manufacturer-customer relations or user-active 
innovation. In this sense, every passenger jet that takes-off, is in fact a 
customized product rather than a homogenous commodity8.  
Economies of scale9 are so important to making airplanes that this 
industry can support only a few producers. There are currently only two 
companies in the world that produce large long-to-medium range aircrafts 
with more than 100 seats: Boeing in the United States (US) and Airbus 
Industries in Europe. There is no country in the world, with a possible 
3 
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exception of the US, that has a large-enough domestic market that can 
sustain the high Research and Development (R&D) and production costs in 
the aviation industry (Bernardes, 2000: 110).  
Short-range commuter aircrafts are in the segment where Bombardier 
of Canada and Embraer of Brazil are currently competing intensely. Several 
other companies have already withdrawn from this market segment due to 
the inability to sustain profits. They include Fokker of the Netherlands, Saab 
of Sweden, British BAe, US Raytheon, and German Fairchild Dornier 
(Maema, 2002: 24). Thus here again, it is more than likely that this short-
range commuter aircraft segment will eventually also limit itself to only two 
or three companies. 
This dominance by only a few companies proves that the core of the 
technology trajectory in the airframe industry is scale economies. R&D 
costs are so immense that only a few models of aircraft in aviation history 
have actually recovered their costs and generated profits. Shear (1994) 
reported staggering figures: Of 22 aircraft companies launched in 1945, only 
5 survived until 1994. That is a survival rate of only 1 in 4. Of 29 jet 
transporters that took to the skies since 1945, only 3, all Boeing jets, 
returned profits. "The $180 billion invested in aircraft in the 40 years 
following World War II produced a gaping $40 billion loss" (Shear 1994: 
xiv). Among the makers of long and medium range passenger aircraft, the 
pioneering British Comet was the first to withdraw, followed by the 
American Convair, Lockheed, and eventually McDonnell Douglass in 1996. 
The acquisition of McDonnell Douglass by Boeing created a combined 
behemoth company that dominated 65 to 70% of the civil aviation aircraft 
market (Bernardes, 2000: 127). Thus, fewer and fewer aircraft makers stay 
open in the market for the industry to remain financially viable.  
In spite of these difficulties, however, strong incentives exist for 
tapping into this risky passenger aircraft industry. Despite the crisis within 
the aviation market that began in the early 1990s to be later aggravated by 
the September 11 attack on the World Trade Center in New York in 2001, 
Bernades (2000: 115) reported that the aviation market will grow three 
times larger in the next 20 years. As long as a company can manage gulping 
down the huge initial R&D and production costs, there is a very lucrative 
airplane market and profits waiting out there in the future (Fig. 1). 
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Figure 1. Estimate of airplane demands by category between 1996–2016 
 
Source: Global Market Forecast: 1997–2016 by Airbus Industries cited in Bernardes  (2000: 116) 
 
Because huge R&D costs are involved, government involvement in 
aircraft development appears to be essential. Sixty percent of total R&D 
spending goes to the aviation industry in countries like the US, Britain and 
France (Bernardes, 2000: 96). Although the proportion is lower in Japan, the 
government's R&D expenditure for the aerospace industry there is at par 
with those for the computer industry (Shear, 1994: 6).  
In many countries, the synergy between the development of military 
and civilian aircraft help to absorb the huge R&D cost. Many technologies 
were first developed for military use but later found applications in civil 
aviation thus allowing continuing revenue stream without additional R&D 
investments. JDA has been purchasing about 75% of total sales of the 
Japanese aircraft industry (Bernardes, 2000: 105) 10 . Examples include 
military transportation, reconnaissance, and air tankers11 (Bernardes, 2000: 
98).  
Table 1 suggests the significance of government R&D involvement in 
this industry. If one combines civil aerospace development and defense,12 
about half of the government R&D, are used for aircraft related industry in 
the US, France, United Kingdom (UK) and Italy.  
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Notice, however, that the absolute amount does not necessarily 
translate into the success and failure of a passenger aircraft industry. While 
Japan spent US$2,443 million on civil aviation, space and defense in 1994, 
the Brazilian government spent only US$201 million in 1996. Furthermore, 
there are many countries that do not own their own passenger aircraft 
industry such as Italy that spent much more than Japan in this industry13. 
The absolute size of government R&D does not, therefore determine the 
success or failure in the development of national aircraft industries. The 
figures on Table 1 merely suggest that governments are quite involved. 
Beyond financing, how countries locate their respective national aviation 
industries within the overall industrial organization is also a key 
determining factor between success and failure.  
 
TABLE 1 
GOVERNMENT R&D EXPENDITURE OF SELECTED COUNTRIES 
 
Object Brazil Canada US Japan Germany France UK Italy 
Year 1996 1992 1994 1994 1993 1993 1994 1993 
Civil 
aerospace 
development 
69 324 7448 1357 870 1385 269 3016 
Share in 
total 
government 
R&D (%) 
2.2 9.6 10.9 7.5 5.8 10.1 3.1 37.5
Defense 132 209 37787 1086 1274 4595 3858 523 
Share in 
total 
government 
R&D (%) 
4.2 6.2 55.3 6.0 8.5 33.5 44.5 6.5
Civil space 
& defense 
total 
201 533 45235 2443 2144 5980 4127 3539 
Share in 
total 
government 
R&D (%) 
6.4 15.8 66.2 13.5 14.3 43.5 47.6 44.0
Total 
government 
R&D 
3137 3370 68331 18099 14991 13716 8669 8042 
 
Source: Bernardes (2000)  
 
The aircraft industry also requires system technology. Overall 
planning and design of a new aircraft is not merely an aggregation of 
diverse technologies and parts (Bernardes, 2000: 107). Here lies an 
important difference between the making of Japanese and Brazilian aircraft. 
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succeed .  
In spite of possessing advanced composite materials and other component 
technologies, Japanese corporations have so far failed to design a 
commercial aircraft fuselage after the YS-11 project.  Embraer, on the other 
hand, was able to design an airframe even though Brazil had to depend on 
imported materials and parts. In the ERJ-145/140/135 program, for instance, 
out of 43 first level suppliers, only 1 company is Brazilian. The other 
companies are mostly American (73%) (Cassiolato et al., 2002: 39).  
Another indication of the significance of system technology is seen in 
the fact that Boeing, which increasingly relies on international consortium to 
develop a new aircraft, has been extremely careful not to let this system 
technology leak to its rivals in its major projects such as 767 and 777 
programs (Mowery, 1987). Although calling it a "consortium," Boeing is in 
reality using its partners instead as subsidiaries. The key to the overall 
aircraft design down to the avionics in the cockpit never left the hands of 
Boeing in these projects14.  
Making airplanes also require user-active innovations (Mowery, 
1987). The manufacturers and users, mostly airlines and governments, need 
to form a very close knit network from the time of conceptualizing and 
planning a new aircraft through to final production because of the constant 
need for design improvements and adjustments. According to Boeing's ex-
chairman, Philip M. Condit, the core competency of the company resides in 
the know-how in the large-scale system integration, efficient project and 
production, and especially, the minuscule knowledge of the necessities of 
clients and the constant search for the satisfactions of clients (Bernardes 
2000: 133). There are two reasons for this; the long life span of an aircraft 
and the high as well as risky R&D costs involved.  
Even at the developmental stage, the interaction between the users 
(airlines) and manufacturers remained critically important. Fitting the 
airplane into the correct market segment will determine between success 
and failure. If there is a competitor developing another aircraft in the same 
segment but ahead in terms of development time frame, this time advantage 
can entirely destroy the viability of any other aircraft development 
programs. Airlines have a strong incentive to use the same made of 
aircraft15 to save on parts and training leaving little room for new comers to 
penetrate the market. Thus finding the right market (airline clients) and 
developing the right aircraft is essential to 16
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COMPARING BRAZIL TO JAPAN  
 
Two important differences between Brazil and Japan have become 
determining factors for the relative success in developing their respective 
national aircraft industries.17 In Brazil, the government was able to establish 
a single unified administrative structure under the Ministry of Aeronautics. 
In Japan, on the other hand, government participation was instead 
fragmented into separate government institutions. In Brazil, a specialized 
national champion firm, Embraer, was established. In Japan, a consortium 
approach was adopted instead. These two factors: the form of government 
participation and the corporate structure adopted produce critically 
important effects as summarized in Table 2. 
 
Type of Government Support 
 
One of the most significant achievements of the Brazilian government was 
that it concentrated all authorities related to the aircraft industry into one 
administrative organ: the Ministry of Aeronautics. In 1941, the Ministry of 
Aeronautics was created for both civil aeronautics and air force. Thus, the 
unified government institution that would control both air-traffic and aircraft 
production was born18. By doing so, the Brazilian government was able to 
commit itself to the development of aircraft industry without bureaucratic 
bickering with other ministries. The Ministry of Aeronautics is positioned 
above all other ministries including the Brazilian Air Force. It is in charge 
of producing aircrafts for both civilian and military usages, and regulating 
the airline business as well.  
In contrast, the government's overseeing of Japan's aviation industry 
was marred by the crash of interests among at least three ministries; the 
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), in charge of producing 
of aircraft19, the Ministry of Transportation that given charge of air traffic 
operations, and the JDA, in charge of military aircraft development, 
procurement and operation20.  
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TABLE 2 
TECHNOLOGY REGIMES COMPARING BRAZIL TO JAPAN 
 
Technology 
Regimes 
 Country (I) Type of Government 
Support 
(II) Type of Industrial 
Organization 
A Brazil Unitary Administration 
 Ministry of Aeronautics 
Specialized National Champion 
Firm 
 Embraer SA 
Institutional 
Settings 
B Japan Fragmented Administration 
 Three different 
administrative bodies 
(MITI, Ministry of 
Transportation and JDA). 
Consortium by Conglomerates 
 MHI, FHI, KHI, and two 
minor corporations. 
 (YS-11 Project) 
C Brazil  A clear signal of 
commitment from one 
source facilitates credible 
commitment among 
players. 
 Because survival or death for 
Embraer is at stake, it will 
commit itself to achieve the 
economies of scale.  
Economies of 
Scale 
 To establish 
economies of 
scale, credible 
commitment is 
essential 
D Japan  Mixed signals of 
commitment from multi-
ple ministries/agencies 
create confusion and 
doubts.  
 There is no strong leadership 
& commitment as each 
member is only partially 
responsible of the project. 
 Battle among the divisions 
within a conglomerate 
weakens the aircraft division. 
E Brazil  National Security and 
Industry are together. 
 Can nurture nationalistic 
development. 
 A single firm can commit 
itself to system technology 
without worrying about 
collective action problems.  
System 
Technology 
 To master 
system tech-
nology, the 
industry must 
have a strong 
incentive to 
complete 
system 
F Japan  National Security and 
Industry is separated.  
 JDA and MITI's interests 
are different.  
 Weak nationalistic 
development. 
 Because of the divisions of 
labor and rivalry among 
consortium members, it is 
very difficult to provide 
incentive to master system 
technology. 
G Brazil  Better communication as 
airlines and the manufac-
turer know who in the 
government is 
coordinating. 
 Embraer is a sole channel for 
airlines (customers) to 
communicate and improve 
the products. 
User-active 
Innovation 
 To master user 
active innova-
tion, good 
communi-
cations between 
manufacturers 
and airlines 
must be 
established.  
H Japan  MITI does not communi-
cate with airlines well 
because it is not respon-
sible of operation side. 
 Ministry of Transporta-
tion uncooperative with 
MITI.  
 Airlines were confused which 
company to make claims and 
requests to.  
 
When Japan was occupied by the US after the end of World War II, 
both MITI and Ministry of Transportation tried to expand their respective 
administrative powers in 1951. In 1952, the "political" solution was to 
divide the powers into two; the operation side was given to the Ministry of
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 Transportation while the production side was put under MITI (Maema, 
2002, pp. 180–87). The rivalry between these two ministries had since been 
bitter and resulted, among other things, in the cancellation of some of the 
YS-11 purchases. Airline operations come under the regulation of the 
Ministry of Transportation but airline production come under the 
supervision of MITI. For example, based solely on operational reasons, All 
Nippon Airways (ANA) elected to import the F-27 Fokker Friendship turbo-
prop transport from the Netherlands instead of buying the domestically 
produced YS-11, thus sidelining MITI's priorities. Another major Japanese 
airline Japan Airlines (JAL), refused to buy YS-11. Even when one ministry 
said no, another ministry would say yes allowing company objectives as 
opposed to national objectives to take precedence over critical decisions 
made. In Brazil where the government supervision role over aircraft 
production and operations is unitarily centered in one ministry, the kinds of 
inter-ministerial bickering that Japan faced did not arise.  
 
Type of Industrial Organization 
 
Many studies on the Japanese economic "miracle" praised the consortium 
approach that typifies Japanese business for the effects that consortiums 
have on rectifying collective actions (Johnson, 1982; Okimoto, 1989). They 
argue that consortiums avoid redundant R&D and thus are able to share 
results from research conducted to the benefit of all consortium members 
while at the same time reducing the risk from investments. Furthermore, by 
restricting excessive competition, the Japanese corporations in many 
industrial segments succeeded in upgrading their technologies in remarkably 
short time.  
On the other hand, a national champion firm, which tended to be state 
owned entreprises (SOE)21, is usually prone to inefficiency (Waterbury). 
The Brazilian computer company COBRA, France's Bull, and many other 
nationally owned monopolies were considered typical examples of 
inefficient SOEs. Indeed, no SOEs in the computer industry were 
successful. This study, however, challenges this traditional notion and 
argues instead that under certain situations, a single national champion firm 
not only works but also is the only form of industrial organization that can 
work in the case of the aircraft industry22.  
This author maintains that an aircraft (and aerospace in general) 
unlike many industries, requires a national champion firm—a single firm 
supported by the government and representing the nation. No company, 
even a US company that has the access to the world's largest domestic 
aviation market, can survive without exporting planes. Because of this need 
10 
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to sell in the exports market for airplanes, the types of inefficiencies that are 
typically attributed to a national champion firm are not as evident since the 
firm has to compete in international markets.  
As Mowery (1987) suggested, there has been increasing numbers of 
international consortiums that share in the development costs. But, such 
consortiums must not be confused with the typical Japanese style 
consortium. In an international consortium, a single company has to play the 
leadership role relegating other member companies to assume subsidiary 
roles. Mowery also maintained that strong leaders such as Boeing in its 767 
project led successful joint ventures. Airbus Industries which was created in 
1970 has a similar international consortium set up involving four 
companies: French Aerospatiale, British Aerospace, German Daimler Benz  
and Spanish Construcciones Aeronáuticas S.A. (CASA) (Bernardes, 2000: 
104)23. Yet, Airbus Industries is a specialized aircraft company with one 
strong and clear leadership provided by the French partner. As long as a 
clear leadership is established and other participants accept subordinate 
roles, such a type of consortium, which is substantially similar to 
subcontracting, can produce positive results.  
Similarly, a manufacturer must be a specialized firm to make 
airplanes. This is due to the fact that it takes many years for an aircraft 
company to be profitable and needs to expect huge initial losses. If a 
member company is a conglomerate like in the case of Japan, the aircraft 
division becomes the target to blame by the other profitable divisions from 
the same conglomerate. Therefore, unless the president of the conglomerate 
is able to convince the other divisions as was seen in the case of Canada's 
Bombardier, huge losses faced before the plane being developed can make 
its first flight by the aircraft division of the company cannot be sustained24. 
Conglomerates tend to limit their financial commitments to the aircraft 
division keeping losses small.  
In the case of Brazil, upon the successful development of the IPD-
6504, later known as the EMB-110 Bandeirante, the Brazilian government 
decided to establish the company called Embraer as the national champion 
firm for Brazil's aircraft industry under Presidential Decree in August 1969 
(Ramamurti, 1987: 184–185, 191). Since then, the company has also 
succeeded in developing a series of regional turbo-props and jets which 
includes the Brasilia as well as best-seller ERJ-140 series and moving on to 
the ERJ-170 and 190 series. Embraer focused only on designing and 
developing airframes to be flown with North American made engines like 
the Pratt and Whitney turbo-prop. Although as a consequence to the 
financial crisis faced by Brazil during the late 1980s, Embraer was 
11 
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privatized in 1994. Regardless, the nature of a specialized champion firm 
did not change.  
In the case of Japan, the YS-11 project started in 1959 when Nippon 
Aircraft Manufacturing Corporation (NAMC) was established. The NAMC 
was a consortium of six aircraft fuselage-manufacturing companies. Three 
were giant conglomerates: MHI, KHI, and FHI25 and two were medium-size 
corporations: Nippi and Showa Aircraft Industries. The first YS-11 test 
plane was produced in 1962. The production model received the FAA26 
certification in 1964. The YS-11 started flying regular commercial routes 
the following year (Maema, 1999: 36–37). The YS-11 project, however, 
ended in 1973 after producing only 182 planes. Mounting deficits created 
during the development, production, and operation had rendered the YS-11 
financially unsound (Maema, 1999: 37). Since then, there has been no 
Japanese passenger aircraft developed except for business and utility planes 
until this day.  
The Japanese government could not commit itself enough to establish 
a specialized aircraft company after the huge loss created by the YS-11 
project. The YSX project in 1966 again tried to use NAMC consortium 
without a clear leadership and a specialized company. The project resulted 
in the cancellation in 1969.  
 
Commitment to Achieve Economies of Scale 
 
When the economies of scale are immense, massive initial investments are 
needed and therefore credible commitment of the government becomes an 
essential feature for inducing private sector interests into the industry  
(Table 2). When a government adopts a certain industrial policy, it gives out 
a national investment priority signal that private sectors react to, thus, 
affecting how industry formation will shape in the country. Obviously, the 
government's effects on the private sector will not be immediate. Quite 
frequently, the private sector is suspicious of what the government is trying 
to do and remains unresponsive to the government intentions.27 Therefore, 
the government has to try to establish the perception that the government 
has made a "credible commitment". In the case of Brazil, the signal was 
more obvious, that was emitted from one ministry. The private sector took 
to the signal more seriously. In Japan, on the other hand, different signals 
came from various ministries. The private sector had been more suspicious 
of government credibility, for instance, there was a lack of interest in 
purchasing the YS-11 planes by the Japanese airlines for which the Japanese 
government could have been more forceful in bringing about more active 
local demand.  
12 
IJAPS, Vol. 2, No. 2 (November 2006) Choice of national strategy and industrial organization 
 
In Brazil, Embraer, as a company from a developing country, could 
be expected to face problems in financing sales. Aircrafts are expensive to 
buy and private financing would favor better known aircraft models from 
tested aircraft makers rather than a new aircraft producer without prior 
success. Brazil's Embraer have had thus to rely on Bank of Brazil's subsidy 
(Ramamurti, 1987; Sarathy, 1985) to finance its sales. Without this 
commitment by the government of Brazil so that long-term loans become 
available to airlines buyer, it would have been impossible for Embraer to 
sell its aircrafts.  
This lack of similar unified support by the Japanese government, on 
the other hand, hindered the sales of the YS-11 (Maema, 1999b: 227–31). 
The divided Japanese government could not set up any financing scheme 
that resulted in massive deficits faced by the NAMC consortium that made 
the YS-11. The consortium itself had to, instead, finance the sales for 
customers. But private banks were reluctant to set up a financial scheme for 
NAMC without the guarantee of the Japanese government. Even member 
companies of the same consortium for the YS-11 were reluctant to provide 
collateral for loans from private banks.  
When the new passenger aircraft project YSX started in 1966, the 
lack of credible commitment by the Japanese government was also apparent. 
MHI, which was the largest contractor of the YS-11 project, did not hesitate 
to criticize the lack of commitment by Japan's MITI. Already burned by the 
huge deficits due to the YS-11, MHI and other private sector participants 
were not going to take further risk in the new development project involving 
the YSX (Maema, 2002: 222–23). As a result, the YSX project never took 
off.  
Credible commitments can also be derived by creating a situation 
such that both the company and the industry have to succeed under a do or 
die environment (Table 2). In other words, there would be no partial success 
solutions. No excuses for not performing well and yet survive. To bring 
about such an environment, it was vital to create a specialized company, in 
this case to build airframes in Brazil. It was extremely difficult for the 
private sector to commit itself in such a risky industry. Accordingly, the 
private sector has instead been fond of diversifying its business into product 
lines that are safer, more stable, and maybe even less R&D intensive to 
avoid investment risks. Embraer, was therefore entirely forced upon by the 
government but it gave wholehearted support. Part of the justification was 
that the government formed the most important customers in this industry 
and in many ways a sole procurator as would be the case for defense 
products.  
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When Embraer was established as a national company, the mission 
was clear: establishing both civilian and military airframe (fuselage) 
industry. It was a strategic choice to give up its 1930s and 1940s dream of 
producing everything (Cassiolato et al., 2002: 9). It did not vacillate among 
various business options and remained focused. "Embraer consistently 
focused on the design of aircraft, the manufacture of the fuselage, and the 
final assembly operations, staying away from the manufacture of high value, 
high technology inputs such as engines, landing gear, and avionics" 
(Ramamurti, 1987: 199)28. Although Embraer was considered as an SOE 
until it was privatized in 1994, its ownership was very unique taking 
advantage of both private and public enterprise (Ramamurti, 1987). The 
Brazilian government "forced" private corporations to own certain share of 
the stock while the government maintained at least 51% of voting shares of 
the company. To sweeten private participation, Brazilian corporations were 
given a unique fiscal incentive: up to one percent of the income tax owed to 
the federal government could be offset by investing instead into Embraer. 
By making Embraer semi-private, the government was able to avoid legally 
binding bureaucratic control procedures of wholly government-owned 
enterprise like Petrobras and Electrobras (Ramamurti, 1987).  
The Japanese consortium experience had been very different from 
Brazil's Embraer. Consortium members were conglomerates with highly 
diversified business interests.  None of the three major contractors, MHI, 
FHI, and KHI, was a specialized firm for aircraft design. Such a 
conglomerate approach created two problems. First, the aircraft division 
received pressures from other divisions of the same company whenever 
huge initial investments that did not generate profits were made. The 
consortium's priorities tended to center on making profits as would be 
expected rather than to foster the growth of a new national industry, in this 
case the making Japanese airplanes. MHI's aircraft division's sale consisted 
merely 10% of the parent company's total now and, when the YS-11 project 
was initiated, this share was even smaller (Maema, 1999b: 244). Indeed, 
MHI had to eventually withdraw from the MU 300 business jet aircraft 
project in 1988 due to the pressures from other divisions (Maema, 2002:  
203–208). The consortium approach bites both ways. For instance, the 
aircraft division could merely slack and not performing well, since other 
divisions can compensate losses made in the aircraft division. In this sense 
therefore the consortium setting will results in the lack of seriousness and 
commitment which are critical elements needed for an industry like making 
aircraft to succeed (Maema, 2002: 319, 107–109).  
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 The lack of commitment from members of consortium was significant 
(Maema, 2000: 107–109). For instance, when NAMC decided on who 
should be the chief designer for the YS-11 in 1958, a consensus could not be 
achieved among member companies. Instead an academic, Mr. Kimura, was 
eventually assigned so that no company would complain (Maema, 1996a: 
201–202). This was a typical problem of the lack of unequivocal leadership 
in any consortium approach. NAMC was organized in such a way that no 
single company was powerful enough to play a dominant over the rest and 
take the leadership position. Without clear leadership, companies member 
became reluctant to commit themselves and were preoccupied with failure 
instead of success (Ibid., 220–221). 
In the case of MHI, had it committed itself not only as an overall 
designer of YS-11 but also as chief financial controller, the YS-11 project 
could have produced a better result. MHI was responsible of 54.2% of 
design and manufacturing, followed by KHI (25.3%) and FHI (10.3%). The 
remaining was carried out by many small manufacturers (Maema, 2002: 
168). MHI's commitment to the YS-11 project was extremely weak. The 
chief designer of the YS-11, Mr. Tojo, from MHI, had this to say, "This 
project would end up just producing one or two test airplanes… The YS-11 
project can last no longer than ten years. We do not have to think about 
making YS-11 as a series to make the life-span longer…We are forced into 
this project by the government and need not to be responsible of it. We are 
the victims." Later, MHI's President, Mr. Makita, added, "YS-11 was a 
government, not a private, project. We should not be responsible of the huge 
deficit that this project has created. The government should take care of it." 
This last comment by Makita was one of the most important factors that led 
to the termination of Japan's YS-11 project.  
A member of the House of Representatives, Mikio Abe of the Japan 
Socialist Party29, pointed out the nature of consortium in this industry in the 
House Budget Committee meeting in 1972. He claimed that the reason why 
the YS-11 project went into deficit was that major participants of the 
consortium entered all the financial losses into the project instead of 
dividing the losses across the respective company's accounts, as 
"somebody" including MITI, would eventually absorb the deficits (Maema, 
2000: 83).  
While the YS-11 failed as a business, it did achieve technological 
success. The engineers who worked on the project knew one another during 
World War II while they were designing military aircrafts (Maema, 1996a: 
253–254). There was esprit de corps among these engineers motivated by 
passion to revive a once active Japanese aviation industry. But the YS-11 
project faced a far from ideal institutional setting. It could have been a lot 
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different if MITI had been able to establish a national champion firm, or at 
least to convince Mitsubishi to be a sole contractor rather than to be a part of 
the consortium. Although in some other industries such as semiconductors, 
automobiles, and personal computers did not require a single national 
champion firm in order to succeed, the aircraft industry was different 
because of the huge initial costs sunk and the requirement of long-term state 
commitment. 
In the "domestic" consortium approach adopted for building airplanes 
in Japan, there were too many companies for starting a new national aircraft 
industry. No country in the world ever started with three major companies 
and two mid-size companies all sharing the same airframe production 
market except for Japan (Maema, 2002: 319). Such a "five-firm 
configuration" was not economically rational but they nevertheless existed 
alongside one another because of the nature of defense procurement—a kind 
of "politics" between the aircraft industrial complex and the government 
"client".  
 
System Technology—Strategy Choice and Industrial Organization 
 
An aircraft design would need a system technology set up rather than the 
aggregation of parts technology (Table 2). The know-how needed to design 
and integrate aircraft components and parts are quite different and cannot be 
obtained merely by producing the entire range of different components and 
parts that make an aircraft. Making planes is very different from making 
computers.  
For security reasons as well as for a national pride, the military 
aircraft development is the segment that the government wants to achieve 
self-sufficiency. Even Japan, after giving up designing a whole civilian 
aircraft after the YS-11, still maintained a strong desire to achieve self-
sufficiency in the military field. As recent as the FSX (the current F-2) 
project in the 1980s, the Japanese government and defense contractors 
fought a battle against US pressures to license an American made fighter jet 
instead of one entirely of Japanese origin30.  
Had the military segment of the government and the civilian side been 
under a single administrative structure like was the case in Brazil, there 
would have been a strong incentive to nurture a domestic system design 
capability for making airplanes within Japan. Nonetheless, the Japanese 
institutional setting was a problem. The JDA, which was responsible for 
defense but not for industrial development, had two choices either to 
procure defense equipment needs domestically or import them. Almost all 
Japanese aircraft manufacturing companies had gained (astonishing 75% of 
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revenues) from defense sales. Thus domestic equipment sourcing should 
have been the optimal choice that would have had spin-off potential to civil 
aviation applications. Yet, defense needs that are not exactly concomitant to 
the requirements for the civilian applications aside, JDA preferred procuring 
more foreign made weapons deemed to be less expensive than those 
produced locally. MITI, which on the other hand was responsible for the 
civil aviation industry would prefer instead building up Japanese aviation 
technologies. Indeed, there had always been many difficult negotiations 
between JDA and MITI whenever a new aircraft development was planned. 
JDA had always insisted on the military capabilities of aircraft to be 
designed but it was not fully committed to building a domestic aviation 
technology capabilities. Instead JDA often yielded to pressures by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) to buy US made weaponry in order to 
help reduce diplomatic tensions between America and Japan over Japan's 
significant trade surplus with America. Although MITI faced the same 
pressures in relation to Japan-American trade, JDA had been more prone to 
them because, first, the military equipment is one of the few segments in 
which the U.S. has had a trade surplus with Japan, and help compensate 
overall American trade deficits. Second, JDA did not have a clear mission to 
develop domestic industries the way MITI had. Furthermore, JDA had only 
an agency status in the Japanese government rather than the Ministry status 
that MITI enjoyed.  
The advantage for nurturing system technology that a single company 
had over a consortium was quite apparent (Table 2). The core competency 
of a single national champion firm laid in its ability to integrate various 
components mostly available in the world market and design an aircraft 
whole. While, even in a consortium, there could be only one company given 
the responsibility for the entire design of an aircraft, but unlike a single 
champion firm, there would be less commitment from the other uninvolved 
consortium members. For example, Boeing also adopted an international 
consortium of firms to reduce risks from huge R&D spending in its 767 and 
777 projects. But in Boeing's case, the company is already an experienced 
aircraft designer and maker. Boeing would never release core technologies 
and know-how of the overall design to other members and retains its 
authority to control the whole design. Thus, this kind of consortium was 
rather a form of subcontracting, offering a business opportunity to Boeing's 
foreign partners in exchange for sharing part of the development investment 
risks, rather than a contract of equal members, the way NAMC's consortium 
was.  
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User-Active Innovations  
 
User-active innovations concern the relation between the production side 
and the operation side. As the customers of passenger aircrafts are the major 
airlines in the world, the manufacturers need to maintain good reciprocal 
relationship with airlines. Obviously, if the administration for both a 
production and an operation side is united, the coordination would be much 
simpler. When they are separated instead, the bureaucratic bickering can 
break down the progress of nurturing industry, which was the experience in 
Japan (Table 2).  
In Brazil, the Ministry of Aeronautics was given charge of aircraft 
operations as well as production. Therefore, while Embraer was yet to 
develop capabilities that would allow competition in the world aviation 
market, Brazil's government was able to put pressures alongside incentives 
for domestic airlines to use Embraer products. Basically, government 
regulations can be fine-tuned to help enhance Embraer's competitiveness. 
Although the Ministry still had to face various forms of opposition within 
the Brazilian government, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the 
Ministry of Commerce that have other priorities, such as easing trade 
tensions with the United States and other powerful foreign countries, the 
resistance that the Brazil aviation industry had to meet was obviously much 
less than what Japanese airplane makers had to encounter.  
Fighting between Japan's MITI and the Ministry of Transportation 
resulted in shortcomings in the development of user-active innovations. 
Unlike in the ship-building industry where the Ministry of Transportation 
controlled both manufacturing and operation, Japanese aircraft industry was 
instead divided between MITI, given responsibility for production, and the 
Ministry of Transportation, which was responsible for regulations and 
operations. However, this division was not harmonious. The Ministry of 
Transportation had sought to take complete control of Japan's aircraft 
industry.  
After the YS-11 began to sell to the airlines, the Ministry of 
Transportation could have helped improve the quality of the aircraft through 
user-active innovations that covers some of the core technology regimes in 
the aircraft industry. But, the Ministry of Transportation, with its confusing 
and overlapping roles with MITI showed little willingness to help do this. 
User-active relations between an aircraft maker and aircraft customer users 
had thus to be maintained without proper government support. Japanese 
airlines had to organize themselves without the help of the Ministry of 
Transportation to help provide customer feedbacks and design inputs to 
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Japanese aircraft makers and negotiate to improve the quality of the recent 
YS-11 aircraft (Maema, 2000: 184–185)31. 
On the question of how the type of industrial organization affects 
user-active innovations in Brazil and Japan (Table 2), such lack of 
commitment was reflected in YS-11's approach to the customers: airlines. 
The first Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the consortium, Teruo Tojo of 
MHI, considered the project as a test project in which only less than twenty 
aircrafts would be produced. Thus, he had no idea how to accommodate the 
design demands made by user airlines (Maema, 2000: 129). This is due to 
the fact that MHI considered this project not as its own, but rather one that 
had been forced upon by MITI. Instead of user-active innovations what 
happened in reality were negative relations between a manufacturer and 
customers. Those airlines that were arm-twisted into buying and using the 
YS-11 by MITI had to then spend a lot of time and energy, as well as 
patience, to obtain after-sales support with the airplane's manufacturer, 
NAMC, which showed much reluctance to effectively serve its airline 
customers. It therefore became natural that Japanese airlines do not ask for 
further continuous development of Japanese made aircrafts. The user-
innovation environment was just not there.  
This problem did not emerge in the case of Embraer. It was a sole 
channel for airlines to communicate for trouble-shooting, suggest improving 
the products, and plan for the future lines of products based on the 
collaboration. Embraer developed the customer's service centers in major 
export destinations and continue working with customer airlines.  
 
 
IMPLICATIONS OF THIS STUDY  
 
We learn that it is very difficult for governments and private companies to 
understand the technological regime ahead of time so that industry can also 
be accordingly organized in advance. The same was also learnt in the 
author's previous study on the development of the Information and 
Technology (IT) industry in both Taiwan and South Korea (Kanatsu, 2002). 
When the governments from both these countries tried to develop a broad IT 
hardware industry including various types of semiconductors as well as 
personal computers, they adopted the existing industrial organization upon 
which the new industries were built. As a result, South Korea became a 
successful producer of semiconductors for computer memories but not 
Taiwan which found success instead in developing the Application Specific 
Integrated Circuit (ASIC).  
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It will be difficult for any government to construct a new industrial 
organization within a nation from scratch. Usually when a country ventures 
into a new industry, there is usually an industrial organization already in 
existence equipped with huge business interests in place. In this study on the 
approach that a country might follow to develop a national aircraft industry, 
it was found that various other Brazilian industries were also developed with 
the same industrial organization as its aircraft industry. In the case of 
computers for example, Brazil's government also established a national 
champion firm called the COBRA much like Embraer as the champion firm 
for its aircraft industry. The government protected the domestic market from 
a foreign competition, and put pressures on the domestic companies to 
purchase domestically produced computers instead of international brands. 
Japan, which on the other hand preferred the consortium approach, also 
developed its aircraft industry based on the industrial organization already 
in existence in Japan. The fundamental philosophy behind Japanese 
consortiums is the ability to diversify risks associated with a huge high-tech 
investment, because there will be a mixture of different business types, such 
that failure in certain business can be offset but success in other business 
within the same consortium.  
Some might go on to suggest that foreign pressures might also have 
an influence on the approaches chosen in Brazil and in Japan. While it may 
be true that aircraft manufacturers from both the United States and Europe 
did exert pressures on both Japan and Brazil on issues of trade imbalance, 
both countries were similarly affected and therefore such pressures would 
not result in one approach adopted by Brazil and another approach by Japan.  
But the main lesson is the following: Why Brazil succeeded but Japan 
did not in developing a national aircraft industry is because the aircraft 
industry will only work on certain types of industrial organization but not 
other types. It will work with Brazil's government supported champion firm 
but not with Japanese consortiums.  There has been hardly any success after 
the YS-11 in Japan. But Japanese corporations appeared not to have learnt 
their lessons: that system technology needed for making aircraft is different 
from the aggregation of parts technology applicable to most other types of 
industries. As one can see from the very success of automobile industry in 
Japan, it is not the case that the Japanese companies cannot master system 
technology. Instead, the core strength of the Japanese auto-manufacturing 
developed in typical Japanese consortium fashion is just simply not suitable 
for making airplanes.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
From accounts related in this paper, it is possible to learn and conclude that 
the institutional setting as well industrial organization in existence for 
particular countries can become overriding factors that eventually determine 
whether the level of technological prowess available on hand in these 
countries can in fact be translated into industrial success for these countries. 
This study compares Brazil to Japan by looking at the making of airframes 
for the civil aviation market. While most might accept Brazil to be 
technologically less advanced than Japan, Brazil's relative success in 
developing a national airframe industry over Japan has been the result of 
two factors. First, Brazil had a coherent government administrative structure 
to direct policies and strategies towards the development of this industry, 
instead of the fragmental bureaucratic structure involving multiple 
government ministries in Japan. Second, Brazil was able to organize a 
specialized national champion firm to develop this industry while Japan 
instead adopted a consortium approach involving many firms.32  
Japan had started developing its aircraft industry at a much earlier 
period and on a much larger scale than Brazil. During the World War II, 
Japan manufactured a variety of military aircraft types. Pilots and other 
aircrew who fought against Japanese aircraft then have testified to various 
aspects of flight and combat superiority of Japanese fighters compared to 
those planes produced by Britain and the United States during the early 
period of the war33. When the war ended, Japan was prohibited from any 
form of aircraft-related industry for seven years. Later on Japan did try to 
develop a passenger aircraft industry under the YS-11 project between 1959 
and 1973 but the project ended after accumulating huge deficits. There was 
not any successful commercial passenger aircraft development in Japan 
since then except under subsidiary or licensed manufacturer arrangements 
with American manufacturers. Brazil's venture into its Bandeirante aircraft 
project, which appeared only years after Japan, had on the other hand, been 
more successful. The Embraer Brazilia that followed the Bandeirante turned 
up even more popular among American commuter airliners. Today, Brazil's 
Embraer has successfully built on its customer confidence from these two 
turboprop aircraft, the Bandeirante and the Brazilia to develop and sell full-
jet commuter aircraft types: the EMB-135, EMB-145 and ERJ-170/5 that 
can be found flying commuter routes today in both North America and 
Europe. Besides civil aircraft, Embraer has also successfully developed and 
sell the T-27 Tucano turboprop military trainer/A-27 attack aircraft, this 
aircraft type also being licensed to Shorts in the UK to manufacture trainers 
for the Royal Air Force. In other words, despite Brazil's inferior 
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technological beginnings, institutional settings and industrial organization 
had even allow it to take the lead, in the case of the Tucano, ahead of UK, a 
nation which has a history as an airplane manufacturer that goes back for 
nearly a century.  
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NOTES 
 
 
1. Airframe industry to be exact as many other parts of the plane including engines 
are developed and manufactured outside of Brazil, which itself provides us with a very 
intriguing question on the nature of this industry.  
2.  The Brazilian passenger-aircraft manufacturer Embraer is the crown jewel of 
the Brazilian high-technology industry. "Since 1995, Embraer exported US$11.95 billion 
in products and services, while having been Brazil's largest exporter from 1999 to 2001" 
(Embraer, 2003: 5) and the second largest only following Rio Doce steel company with 
annual gross revenue US$2,676 million in 2002 (Ibid.: 10). This only follows the 
Canadian Bombardier, a major rival of Embraer in regional jet manufacturing, of 
Canadian $11,307 million (Aerospace Division: equivalent of US$8,230 million as of 
June, 2004) in 2003 (fiscal year ending January 2004). The revenue of the largest 
manufacture Boeing Commercial Airplanes Division is US$22,408 million in 2003. 
There have been many trials and ongoing efforts in Asia: China, Japan, South Korea, 
Taiwan and Indonesia have been trying to develop the aircraft industry. However, none 
of them so far has established a sustainable airframe or an aircraft engine industry 
although most of them participated in the industry as parts and material suppliers. 
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3 . Brazil itself had a failed experience with the establishment of a national 
champion firm COBRA (Computadores e Sistemas Brasileiros) in the computer 
industry. Note, however, there are many competitive national champion firms in the 
world including POSCO of South Korea and some formerly nationally owned firms in 
Taiwan. When a firm is judged by its export performance, it is not necessarily true that a 
national champion firm is less competitive.  
4. Ministry of International Trade and Industry, renamed as Ministry of Economy, 
Trade, and Industry (METI) in 2001. 
5. Mistubishi Heavy Industries, Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Ishikawajima-Harima 
Heavy Industries, and Fuji Heavy Industries respectively  
6. The discussion on the relations between the type of products and successful 
innovation has a long history. Some of the discussions started in the 1960s on how the 
technology evolved from a new to a matured one, typically represented in the 
"technology life-cycle" theory (Vernon, 1966; Abernathy & Utterback, 1978). Similarly, 
there have been discussions regarding the industrial organization and the innovation. 
Some of them are concerned about the size of the firms (Chandler, 1962) while others 
discussed the network among engineers such as the one in the Silicon Valley (Saxenian, 
1994). More significantly for this research, Keith Pavitt attempted the taxonomy of the 
type of products and innovation (1984). 
7. Aircraft industry can be divided into three segments; airframe, engine and 
related electronics and other supporting industries. It is rare that one single company 
manufacture the two core parts of aircraft, namely airframes and engines, as each 
segment requires completely different technologies. This study focuses on airframe 
development as three manufacturers (two US and one British) are dominating engine 
development. 
8. A commodity defined as a product where process development to make the item 
cheaper is a predominant competitive edge over product development. In other words, a 
commodity is a product with matured technology.  
9. This means minimum efficient scale of production is large.  
10. The R&D of the Japanese Military Aircraft after the World War II was 
conducted at the Laboratory Three of the Technical Research and Development Institute, 
known as the Department of Air Systems Development (Shear, 1994: 3). The annual 
budget of military R&D is nothing but meager, totaling about $518 million. (Note: 
Bernardes' account is about twice bigger than Shear's. If the total amount spent for 
military R&D including for land and maritime defense forces, Bernardes' account is 
correct.) The equivalent of Pentagon reaches $35 to $40 billion dollars (Shear, 1994: 4). 
11. For example, the technology to develop a fighter jet is quite different from the 
technology needed for large commercial aircraft. Also, some new technologies such as 
stealth do not have an immediate application for commercial usage.  
12. Note that this figure involves not only aircraft but also other military R&D 
such as maritime and land. However, the largest potion of military R&D is spent by 
aerospace technology.  
13 . The Italian aircraft industry is focusing on military planes including jet 
fighters. However, in 1984, EADS (the parent company of Airbus Industries) and Alena 
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Aeronautica started a joint venture company called ATR to produce turbo-prop ATR 
42/72.  
14. Mowery points out the significant disadvantage of joint venture approach for 
Japan in the post-YS 11 projects with Boeing, such as 767 and 777. "Technology transfer 
also may be controlled or regulated more effectively through joint ventures than through 
licensing. Whereas licensing transactions necessitate the sale of a complete package of 
technological capabilities in many instances, joint ventures enable partner firms to 
"unbundle" their portfolios of technological assets and selectively transfer individual 
components of this portfolio, which in isolation may be worthless to a partner" 
(Mowery, 1987: 12, italics added.). 
15. Or in the same family. For example, Boeing 747 has various family members 
including 747-200, 747-SR, 747-400. Embraer's ERJ-140, 145, and 135 are in the same 
"family" and use many common parts and operation procedures.  
16. "Technology characterized by "user-active" innovation, in Eric von Hippel's 
phrase" (Mowery, 1987: 9).  
17 . Note that the author is NOT arguing that these two differences are 
SUFFICIENT reasons why Brazil succeeded while Japan failed. Rather, these two 
reasons are two of many other reasons needed for success.  
18. The administrative unity mentioned above is complemented by the research 
and educational unity in Brazil. The Brazilian government established: (a) R&D institute 
Centro Tecnico Aerospacial (CTA) in 1945, and (b) an affiliated undergraduate 
educational/training institute, Instituto Tecnologico de Aeronautica (ITA) in 1947 
(Cassiolato et al.: 7). 
19. Currently METI (Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry). 
20. In contrast, the shipbuilding and operation is under unitary control by the 
Ministry of Transportation.  
21. The reasons are because it is monopoly and these firms usually require huge 
investment.  
22. This is not necessarily a new finding. Amsden found the Korean national 
champion steel maker POSCO has been one of the most efficient producers of steel in 
the world (Amsden).  
23. Later, Fokker of Holland and Belairbus of Belgian joined.  
24. Of course, this can be considered as strength as a conglomerate can diversify 
the risks. Yet, to maintain high-cost division, each division is required to make profits to 
keep its position in a conglomerate UNLESS there is a strong political strength in money 
losing divisions.  
25 . Mitsubishi Heavy Industry, Kawasaki Heavy Industry and Fuji Heavy 
Industry, respectively. 
26. Federal Aviation Administration: The US governmental body that regulates 
safety of aircraft and related issues. The certificate from this agency is essential not only 
to operate in the United States, the largest aviation market, but as a proof and prestige of 
safety and quality everywhere in the world.  
27. For example, the Taiwanese government failed to establish this commitment 
(due to political reasons rather than economic) in their PC and semiconductor 
development (Kanatsu, 2002).  
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28. "As a result, imported components account for a high proportion of the value 
of EMBRAER's products: 38 per cent of the Bandeirante, 41% of Xavante, 27% of 
Ipanema, and between 47 and 71% of various models of the Piper aircraft" (Ramamurti, 
1987: 199). This problem of not having spillover effects to other industry is a different 
but significant issue when thinking about Brazil's macro technological catch-up.  
29. Current SDP (Social Democratic Party).  
30. See Lorrel and Shears for excellent accounts of this FSX project.  
31 . In spite of the difficulty that YS-11 faced, and after intense interaction 
between airlines and the consortium, the mechanical dispatch reliability reached 99.0% 
in 1972 and has been maintaining 99.6~99.8% (the highest among all aircrafts ANA has 
used) even now. Considering that YS-11 was designed more than forty years ago, this 
reliability is quite impressive (Maema, 2000: 185–189). 
32. Needless to say, these two conditions are NOT the only requirements for the 
successful aircraft industry development. Brazil completed various basic homework 
assignments such as the training of engineers, importing certain technologies, and 
investing substantial R&D to achieve the success of aircraft industry. This becomes 
particularly clear when one compares the aircraft industry with other failures such as the 
computer industry. Still, it is important to recognize that the two conditions mentioned in 
this study played a significant role for the success of the Brazilian aircraft industry. 
Without them, the Brazilian case could have ended up like the Japanese failure. This is 
particularly true as most of the homework assignments that Brazil achieved were also 
completed well by the Japanese counterpart. 
33. For example, Mitsubishi Zero was considered superior to Curtis P-40 and 
Grumman F4F Wildcat of the US as well as Hurricane of Royal Air Force.  
